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ABSTRACT

Ferialdy, Arfinandi. M.S.I.E., Purdue University, August 2016. Graph Theoretical Analysis
of The Dynamic Lines of Collaboration Model for Disruption Response. Major Professor:
Shimon Y. Nof.
The Dynamic Lines of Collaboration (DLOC) model was developed to address the Networkto-Network (N2N) service challenge found in e-Work networks with pervasive
connectivity. A variant of the N2N service challenge found in emerging Cyber-Physical
Infrastructures (CPI) networks is the collaborative disruption response (CDR) operation
under cascading failures. The DLOC model has been validated as an appropriate modelling
tool to aid the design of disruption responders in CPIs by eliciting the dynamic relation
among the service team when handling service requests from clients in the CPI network.
The DLOC model for CDR operation is conceptually an abstraction of the CPI network into
two interdependent networks of client and service networks. No preliminary design
guidelines have been devised for DLOC-CDR from a network perspective using graph
properties. Previous results of graph theoretical analysis for network behaviors under
disruption may also not apply to DLOC-CDR due to the intrinsic nature of the N2N service
challenge. Previous research works in DLOC-CDR have also not taken into consideration
in protecting vulnerable CPI network elements which can cause system collapse by a
single failure. Based on these observations, this research is guided by the following

xiv
questions: (1) What graph properties to be viable predictors for evaluating the reliability
of N2N service designs in DLOC and (2) Where should the disruption responders (resource)
to ensure timely disruption mitigation with regards to protection of vulnerable nodes?
To answer question (1), it is found that resiliency of a CPI network, as measured in DLOC
by the Recoverability metric ( 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ), can be approximated by the proportion of

vulnerable nodes (𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ) as a function of average degree and cascade threshold (𝜑𝜑).

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 measures the probability of a network to fully recover from a cascading

disruption. It is found that there lies a certain regime where 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =1 as approximated
by 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 . By means of graph property analysis, we initially proposed two heuristics,

�������
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 >

1

𝜑𝜑

and ∑𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(𝑘𝑘) 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 < 0.70, to mark the regime where 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is strictly 1. From

�������
numerical experiments, it was found that 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺 >

1

𝜑𝜑

is over conservative, while the latter

applies to all tested networks. This experiment result also supports the conclusion that
the existence of a “small-world” phenomenon in networks can either inhibit or accelerate
cascade, depending on the complexity of the propagation.
To answer question (2), two heuristics protocols based on network centrality measures
were initially proposed, namely the Bridge-Based Allocation (BBA) and Degree-Based
Allocation (DBA). We initially hypothesized that the BBA would perform better in terms
of preventing failures but with considerable trade-off in total response time compared to
CBA, the existing resource allocation protocol of DLOC-CDR, in networks with high
modularity. However, it was found that based on numerical experiments we concede that
the BBA is not suitable to be applied in DLOC. The main advantage of the BBA is its ability

xv
to identify bridging elements which its removal will make the network disconnected. The
current DLOC, on the other hand, does not take into consideration of the connectivity
state of the CPI network. Thus, rendering the BBA to become less effective than CBA and
DBA. We also found that both CBA and DBA can be used interchangeably. Given a simple
propagation, DBA constantly performs better on networks displaying high affinity towards
power-law degree distribution compared to CBA. This is due to the high correlation
between both centralities in these networks. For small-world networks, the performance
increment from CBA to DBA has a decreasing trend with increasing network size. CBA’s
performance is relatively constant and outperforms DBA in large network size.

1

CHAPTER 1.

1.1

INTRODUCTION

Motivation: N2N Service Challenge – Disruption Response

Pervasive connectivity in e-Work networks (Nof, 2003) has brought forth a new type of
service challenge in production systems. These challenges are characterized by
increasingly interdependent service requirements and concurrent collaboration among
service providers. A novel method to approach this challenge was proposed recently by
(Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) in the form of Dynamic Lines of Collaboration (DLOC)
model. Inspired by the network-to-network interface ubiquitous in telecommunication
networks, the DLOC model presents a novel abstraction of production systems as two
interdependent networks, namely the client and the server network. The service
challenge is then defined by the DLOC model as how to efficiently provide effective
Network-to-Network (N2N) services in e-Work systems. Let the client network be defined
as graph 𝐺𝐺 = (𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸) where the nodes 𝑁𝑁 and edges 𝐸𝐸 represent the elements of Cyber-

Physical Infrastructure (CPI) and the interdependency between them, respectively. The

server (service team) network is defined as graph 𝑆𝑆 = (𝐴𝐴, 𝑃𝑃) where the nodes 𝐴𝐴 and
edges 𝑃𝑃 denote service agents and collaboration compatibility between them,

respectively. An abstract representation of the N2N services in DLOC model can be seen
in Fig 1.1
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S(A,P)

G(N,E)

Interdependency in the client network
Interaction between the client network and service team
Interdependency in the service team network

Figure 1.1 Abstract representation of N2N services of e-Work in DLOC (Zhong, 2016)
Cascading failure is the mechanism by which failures propagate to cause large-scale
catastrophes in complex systems. Cascading failure leads to the point of explaining largescale blackout phenomenon which occurs in power-grid systems (Dobson et. al., 2007).
Apart from power-grid systems, cascading failure behavior are also imminent in other
man-made CPIs such as in Smart Water Distribution Networks (WDN) (Shuang et. al, 2015).
Other researchers have also found that most man-made CPI network exhibits modularity
(Newman, 2006) and have power-law degree distribution which can be closely modeled
by scale-free networks (Barabasi & Albert 2002). The implication of this is that networks
with power-law degree distribution are less resilient to targeted disruptions as compared
to random networks (Motter & Lai, 2002).
The design of an effective disruption response team (service team) and operation in CPIs
have to take into considerations of the interdependent service requirements between
network elements. The DLOC model provides an appropriate modeling tool to aid the
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design of disruption responders by eliciting the dynamic relation and collaboration among
service agents when handling service requests from clients in the CPI network. Control
protocols have been developed and validated under the DLOC model to improve the
performance of N2N services for Collaborative Disruption Response (DLOC-CDR)
operations. This research will be focused on enhancing the DLOC model usability for
designing and evaluating the performance of N2N services as well as investigating new
protocols to improve DLOC-CDR operations.
1.2

Research Problem

Existing works on graph theoretical analysis of network behaviors under disruption have
not yet analyzed the novel N2N formation of the DLOC model, especially for DLOC-CDR
operations. Due to the intrinsic nature of N2N service challenge, the results of past
analysis may not be applicable as a guideline for designing N2N service teams in e-Work.
The existing resource allocation strategy for DLOC-CDR has also not taken into
consideration of protecting vulnerable nodes in the client network, which can cause
system collapse by a single node failure (Motter & Lai, 2002) or through global cascades
(Watts, 2002; Singh et. al., 2013)
The research problem for this thesis can be defined as follows: To identify a set of graph
theoretical properties for a preliminary guideline of N2N service designs and investigate
new control protocols for resource allocation of service agents for protection of
vulnerable nodes.
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1.3

Research Questions

Based on the aforementioned research problem, the following research questions
should be answered:
1. Research Question 1 (RQ1): Graph Theoretical Analysis of DLOC Networks.
What graph properties that can be viable predictors for evaluating the reliability
of N2N service designs? How good are these predictors?
2. Research Question 2 (RQ2): Protection of Vulnerable Parts of the Network.
Which clients to connect with the service network to ensure timely disruption
mitigation with regards to network topology and protection of vulnerable
nodes?
1.4

Overview of Proposed Methods

This thesis proposes a development of one of the emerging principles of the Collaborative
Control Theory (Nof, 2007) namely the DLOC Model (Zhong & Nof, 2015, Zhong, 2016)
attributing to several network design methods and graph theoretical analysis. The DLOC
model has been established to facilitate the modelling of various CPI systems and develop
solutions for their respective N2N service challenges (Zhong & Nof, 2015, Zhong, 2016).
Graph theoretical analysis will be conducted to find the relation among several basic
network structural properties with the behavior and performance of N2N service for
DLOC-CDR operations. The conclusion made from this analysis is set to establish
preliminary guidelines for N2N service design in e-Work networks.
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The Centrality-based depot allocation (CBA) protocol for service agent resource allocation
on the previous version of DLOC only takes into consideration of the network’s
betweenness centrality. In this research, we will attempt to improve the performance of
DLOC-CDR by approaching the development of new resource allocation protocol from a
network vulnerability point of view on cascading failure. Tools and methods provided
from graph theory will be used in guiding the development of hypothesis and verification
& explanation of experiment results.
Finally, we will validate the proposed method of RQ1 and RQ2 using the Teamwork
Integration Evaluator (TIE) – TIE/DLOC on several conceptual and real-world networks,
namely electricity power grids.
1.5

Assumptions

The studies conducted in this research are built upon these following assumptions:
1. Propagation of services (failures)
Client network of the DLOC model request services which are to be fulfilled by the
server network. In terms of DLOC-CDR, the client networks are CPIs while the
server networks are disruption responder agents. The client network requests
services to the server networks whenever it experiences a failure. The propagation
of failure or service request among the elements of client network will be modeled
based on adapted Watts Threshold model (Watts, 2002).
2. Service team (Disruption responders)

6
The disruption responder agents travel within the client network according to the
client’s network topology. It is assumed that each edge in 𝐺𝐺(𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸) represents

one-unit length and the paths for agents to move are invulnerable to disruption,
i.e. even though an edge or node is in failure state, an agent can still traverse
through.

3. Collaboration of service provider
Disruption responder agents are required to collaborate with each other to fulfill
certain types of service requests, i.e. to recover an edge in client network requires
the collaboration of two agents. The collaboration compatibility among responder
agents is denoted by an edge between them in the server network.
4. Scheduling protocol
The order in which a service is served within a queue follows the neuro-plasticity
inspired protocols (Zhong, 2016). By this protocol, it is also assumed that the client
network has an ability to add auxiliary edges to increase the robustness of local
area to cascading failure.
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CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE SURVEY

In this chapter, we will first review the DLOC model and its current development.
Afterward, we will survey several literatures related to Graph theory application and
analysis on complex networks. We will also be covering other topics related to complex
networks are diffusion process, cascading failures, and disruption mitigation.
2.1

The Dynamic Lines of Collaboration Model (DLOC)

2.1.1 General Description
The Line of Collaboration (LOC) principles under Collaborative Control Theory (CCT) (Nof,
2007) addresses the relation among system elements (agents) to perform tasks in e-Work
systems. Dynamic team structures are essential in e-collaboration, especially under
emergent situations ((Velasquez, Yoon, & Nof, 2010). This statement is supported by the
fact that different teams need to be formed to satisfy various task requirements and
changing team structure is critical for the sustainability of the entire organization
(Velasquez, Yoon, & Nof, 2010). Thus, the LOC are constantly updating inside and
between teams.
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The pervasive connectivity in emergent e-Work networks also administers collaboration
requirement between interdependent networks, namely client and server networks
(Zhong & Nof, 2015). For example, in a Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), where elements are
interdependent through cyber and physical links, service requirement from a client in a
CPS will influence the other services in the same network, which dynamically affects the
LOC within the server networks to provide their services. The concurrent collaboration of
multiple servers is required to ensure that the service is provided promptly and prevents
to become complicated by time.
The DLOC model was developed to address the emerging Network-to-Network (N2N)
service challenge in e-Work systems. It captures all details of the dynamic interactions
between the client and the server networks: A networked service team whose
collaborative operations are dependent on the team structure and the requirements from
the client network. The dynamic service request from the client network are dependent
on existing services as well as the interdependency within the clients (Zhong & Nof, 2015).
2.1.2 Formulation of DLOC-CDR (Zhong & Nof, 2015)
The main formulation of DLOC consists of four major building blocks: client network,
service network, service propagation and prevention of failure by service agents. The
mathematical models for each building blocks are subject to the nature of the e-Work
system under consideration. Therefore, the DLOC model is flexible to be implemented
on various systems with subject to different control protocols and network structure.
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2.1.2.1 Client Network
A client network is defined as 𝐺𝐺 = (𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸) with link distribution 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 , where 𝑁𝑁 is set of

nodes connected by edge (link) 𝐸𝐸 and |𝑁𝑁| & |𝐸𝐸| represent the number of node and edges
in the network, respectively. A edge (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) represent dependency the between two

adjacent nodes (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) . The incidence matrix 𝑴𝑴𝑮𝑮 = (𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ) maps out the incidence
relationship between nodes (𝑛𝑛 𝜖𝜖 𝑁𝑁) and edges (𝑒𝑒 𝜖𝜖 𝐸𝐸) in client network G and adjacency
matrix 𝑨𝑨𝑮𝑮 = (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) contains the number of edges connecting nodes 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 𝜖𝜖 𝑁𝑁). For

simplicity we assume that the client network is a simple graph; no parallel edges or loops,
such that 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 𝜖𝜖 𝑁𝑁. Each nodes or edge in 𝐺𝐺 has two states at any time step:

0 or 1. In ‘0’, the element is active – not requesting service, while ‘1’ represent the
element is disrupted – requesting service. Disruptions that occur at time t are categorized
into two types: edge failure and node failure.
Client network edge failure 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 1 and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 _(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 0

Client network node failure: 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (𝑖𝑖) = 1 and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 _(𝑖𝑖) = 0

(2.1)
(2.2)

2.1.2.2 Failure and Service Propagation

Let F be the set of disruptions which occur in the client network. The mapping from node
failures and link ruptures to F is as follow: a node failure is defined as a single disruption
(𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝐹), and an edge failure is represented as two coupled disruptions (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐹). Each

disruption is uniquely defined by a 3-tuple (𝑖𝑖 = < 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 >, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝐹 ), where 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is the

initial timestamp of this disruption (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0); 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 represents the location of the disruption
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(𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁). Note: here 𝑖𝑖 is not the index of nodes in G but an element of F; 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is a failure
reference defined in Eq. (2.3).
Edge failure reference: 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 �

𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 �𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 , 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗 � = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖− �𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 , 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗 � = 0
∅, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 ) = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖− (𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 ) = 0

(2.3)

Eq. (2.3) shows that if two disruptions (𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗) are used to represent an edge failure
together, the rupture references of them point to each other. If a disruption is used to
represent a node failure, the reference is an empty pointer.
The service propagation is modeled using an adapted Watts Threshold Cascade model
(Watts, 2002). Different from the original version, propagation of failure on edges is also
incorporated in our adaptation. In the beginning, all network elements (node and edges)
are in state “0”. When a node or edge experiences a disruption (failure), it switches to
state “1”. The cascading failure is modeled as a sequence of state changes. If a node is
failed at time 𝑡𝑡, all connected edges will also adopt state “1”. At each time step, a node

will assess its connected edges to determine it state. If fraction of edges in state “1” is at
least equal to the cascade threshold 𝜑𝜑, the node adopts state “1”; thus, propagating the
failure. Otherwise it retains its current state, vice versa (0 ≤ 𝜑𝜑 ≤ 1). Edges and nodes
remain in state “1” unless repaired by responders.

2.1.2.3 Service Team
External to the client network (G), the service agents belong to another network defined
as the service team. This network is a k-coloring of a graph 𝑆𝑆 = (𝐴𝐴, 𝑃𝑃) where 𝐴𝐴 is the set
of service agents that can restore failed nodes and edges in the client network. 𝑃𝑃 is set of
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weighted edges which connects them. The number of service agents in the team is
denoted by |𝐴𝐴|. There is a mapping of the node set of the graph, such that 𝑐𝑐: 𝐴𝐴 → 𝑊𝑊,

where 𝑊𝑊 is a set of k colors assignment to the nodes of 𝑆𝑆. Each colors of set 𝑊𝑊 represents
the different capability (skills, responsibility, and workflow) of each service agents, such
no nodes of the same color are adjacent in the network (Bond & Murty, 2007). The node
coloring of graph 𝑆𝑆 is intended to model collaborative constraint of the service team to

accomplish a certain task, such that for given task that requires collaboration, a given
service agent (node) can only collaborate with another service agent which is adjacent to
itself and has the required node coloring (in the case there many node colors which
resembles different expertise). For the service team in this research, we will only apply 2coloring to the graph 𝑆𝑆.

Each agent has two states: 0 for idle and 1 for working. Initially, each agent has an interedge (𝐸𝐸) with one node in 𝐺𝐺 (i.e., the depot). If a node is failed, an agent will be assigned

to repair, and thus transits to state 1. The working agent disconnects itself from its depot
(𝑖𝑖) or current location and connects with the failed node (𝑗𝑗). It is assumed that the travel
of an agent will not be affected by the failures in the client network. Therefore, agents

can connect to failed nodes even if some links or nodes between 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 are failed. This
assumption is reasonable for client networks, because the response team should have
backup means to complete the response task.
The service agents are initially located at depots (𝐷𝐷) and each agent has its own initial
depot. We define a many-to-one correspondence relationship between sets of D and 𝑁𝑁

as (𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 → 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁). This relationship denotes that a node in the client network can be
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represented as the depot for more than one agent. For example, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 → ′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑦𝑦′ ∈
𝑁𝑁. In other words, even though some agents are deployed at the same physical locations
of the client networks, they can be distinguishable by different notations of set 𝐷𝐷. By

using this formulation, we can define that all depots uniform capacity of 1 and only binary
decision variables are required.
To model the relation between service agents and service requests (disruptions), we
establish a virtual graph (𝐷𝐷 ∪ 𝐹𝐹, �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 ∪ 𝐹𝐹�) - 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 here are not the index of 𝑁𝑁. This

virtual graph has a directed and weighted edge denoted by (�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �). The service agents
travel on �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � to handle disruptions. Each edge of the virtual graph has two parts: the

traveling time from two locations (nodes) and the repair timespan used to remove
disruptions.

Weights of virtual graph: 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) + 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝑗𝑗) =

𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)
𝑣𝑣

+ 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝑗𝑗)

(2.4)

The traveling time and the distance function between the represented nodes in the client
network are denoted by

𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) and 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) , respectively. For example, if 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷

and 𝑖𝑖 = ′𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑘𝑘1 ′ ∈ 𝑁𝑁 , the represented node for 𝑖𝑖 is 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑘𝑘1 . Same goes if 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐹

and 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 = ′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑘𝑘2 ′ ∈ 𝑁𝑁 , the represented node for 𝑗𝑗 is 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑘𝑘2 . Thus, 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) is the

distance between 𝑘𝑘1 and 𝑘𝑘2 . The distance function is application specific, where it can be
denoted as Euclidean distance, shortest paths, etc. depending on the network
application. 𝑣𝑣 is the velocity that the agents travel within the same space of 𝑑𝑑. 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝑗𝑗)

is the time required remove disruption at node 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 ,if 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐹. Otherwise, if 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝑗𝑗) = 0.

If 𝑗𝑗 is part of an edge rupture, ( 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘) , 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝑗𝑗) = 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 (𝑘𝑘), which shows the current
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collaboration lasts the same for the repair at two different sites. Collaboration ability of
service agents is specifically designed for N2N services. An edge (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) can only be repaired,
If:

1. Two agents are connected to each ends (nodes) of the edge
2. The two agents can collaborate within the service team (𝑆𝑆) as defined earlier.
2.1.2.4 Prevention of Failure by Service Team
The presence of disruption responders in the node of the client networks enables them
to prevent errors from propagating or ever occurring to the supervised node. Supervision,
node failure prevention, and edge failure prevention are defined as follows.
A node 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, is supervised if and only if a disruption responder agent is located at the
node: there is an inter-edge between this node and the responder.
CPS node supervision (𝑖𝑖) = �

1 ∃(𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎) ∈ 𝐸𝐸
, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐴
0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(2.5)

An edge (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) is supervised if and only if two node incident to the edge are supervised and

the supervising responder are able to collaborate.
CPS node supervision (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = �

1 ∃(𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎) ∈ 𝐸𝐸, (𝑗𝑗, 𝑏𝑏) ∈ 𝐸𝐸, (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) ∈ ∁
, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 (2.6)
0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

As modeled by the Watts Cascade Threshold model, a node will fail if at least 𝜑𝜑 fraction

of its edges are failed. If an edge is supervised, this edge does not as a failed edge to
propagate the failure. Thus, the definition of node failure is updated as follows.
Client node failure:
state (𝑖𝑖) = �

1

∑(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)∈𝐸𝐸 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)−∑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)=1 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 (𝑖𝑖)

0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

≥ 𝜑𝜑

, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁

(2.7)
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A link failure is defined as follows: if only one of its incident nodes is failed, the edge will
fail as the other node is not supervised. If both nodes are failed, the edge will fail unless
it is supervised (Eq. (2.8)).
Client edge failure: state (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) =

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖)𝑥𝑥�1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖)� + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑗𝑗)𝑥𝑥�1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑗𝑗)� 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖) ≠ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑗𝑗)
�
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗)
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑗𝑗) = 1
0
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑗𝑗) = 0
, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁

(2.9)

2.1.2.5 Objective Function

Given all of the DLOC major components have been explained, the mathematical
formulation of the objective function is presented below:
DLOC-CDR objective function: min 𝑧𝑧 = ∑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝐹(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 )

(2.10)

Response sequence constraint: 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≥ ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝐷𝐷∪𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐹

(2.11)

Disruption visit constraint: ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝐷𝐷∪𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝐷𝐷∪𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1 , 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝐹

(2.13)

Sub-tour elimination constraint: ∑𝑖𝑖.𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ |𝐵𝐵| − 1, 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵 ⊂ 𝐹𝐹

(2.15)

Concurrent collaboration requirement: 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 for 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗, 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐹

(2.17)

Cascading function of disruptions: 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐹𝐹0, 𝐺𝐺, 𝑋𝑋)

(2.19)

s.t.

Depot visit constraint: ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝐹 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1, 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷

(2.12)

Depot-wander elimination constraint: ∑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝐷𝐷 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0

(2.14)

Repair constraint: 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝐹

(2.16)

Decision variables for repair tours: 𝑋𝑋 = {𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {0,1}, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 ∪ 𝐹𝐹}

(2.18)
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Where 𝑧𝑧 is the total latency for disruption recovery; 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 is the timestamp when disruption

𝑖𝑖 is recovered; 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is the timestamp when disruption 𝑖𝑖 started; 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary decision
variable indicating if a repair-agent should go from node 𝑖𝑖 to node 𝑗𝑗 (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 are either a depot

or disruption) and 𝑋𝑋 is the set of all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝐵𝐵 is the subset of any disruption; 𝐹𝐹0 is the set of

initial disruption at time 0; and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is a model that generates the entire set of

disruption 𝐹𝐹 based on initial disruptions (see section 2.1.2.2).
2.1.3 TIE-DLOC Simulator

A software tool has been developed to facilitate the modelling of various systems with
the DLOC model and evaluate different protocols called the TIE/DLOC (Zhong & Nof, 2015;
Zhong, 2016). It is based on the previous concepts of Teamwork Integration Evaluator (TIE)
for various systems developed at PRISM Center, Purdue University. The TIE tools apply
parallel computers to simulate distributed e-Work enterprises, decision makers, agents,
or sensors, which are communication and collaborating for a set of tasks. The
input/output diagram of TIE/DLOC is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Input/Output Diagram of TIE/DLOC (From Zhong, 2016)
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2.1.4 Past Developments and Applications
The TIE/DLOC has been previously applied to solve several N2N services challenges
listed as below:
1. Collaborative Disruption Response (Zhong & Nof, 2015)
A collaborative disruption response (CDR) scenario in CPS was simulated on numerical
experiment using three different networks models namely, ER: Erdos-Renyi random
graph (Erdos & Renyi, 1959); BA: Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks (Barabasi &
Albert, 1999; and WS: Watts-Strogatz small-world model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).
The client networks are modelled as people, systems, or other agents having two
states: 0 for not requesting service and 1 for requesting service. They are linked into
a network through their dependencies or interactions. It is assumed that the client
network has a uniformly undirected and unweighted link. The client network will
initiate a service request whenever there is a disruption within the network.
Disruptions are in a form of link or node rupture within the client network.
The service request will propagate throughout a network if not handled. In this work,
a structure-based model is adopted to imitate the service request propagation. It is
assumed that failed elements (nodes/links) will cause structurally connected
elements to fail under the percolation theory (Watts, 2002; Bashan et al., 2011).
The server network is external to the modeled network, but has inter-connected
edges with client network, which can be interpreted physically as repairman depot. A
collaboration relation is defined in the form of links between the server agents if they
have collaborative ability to execute a certain task. If a service depot (server) is
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positioned (supervising) at a certain node within the network, then the server has
error prevention capability attributed to the node. Link rupture prevention can only
be achieved if both ends (nodes) of the links are supervised by a server; both nodes
have interconnected edges to the server network.
The N2N service challenge defined by this work is optimal resource allocation of the
server/responder to manage the propagating service requests. This challenge was
further breakdown in three specific questions: (1) How the team configuration should
be? (2) How should the service depots be allocated? (3) How to schedule service
operations to maximize quality of service?
An Asynchronous Collaboration Requirement Planning (ACRP) framework is
established for the construction of reconfigurable service team to provide flexible
services to the client (to answer (1)). Depot allocation decisions (2) are implemented
by using the Centrality-based depot allocation (CBA) method. In this method, service
agents are initially positioned at nodes that have high betweenness centrality
(Freeman, 1977). This is given the assumptions that the repair agents can only
traverse through the client network using the existing links (regardless of ruptured or
not), e.g. repair agents traveling to restore electricity grids. Neuroplasticity-inspired
protocols where applied to determine the schedule of providing service requested
from the client network (3). This protocol consists of two main components; the
activity-based priority (ABP) protocol (the main assignment protocol) and Auxiliary
Links (ALs) addition procedure to the client network to improve local efficiency in the
recovery operation.
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Experiments were conducted on both conceptual complex network models, namely
Erdos-Renyi random graph (Erdos & Renyi, 1959), Barbasi-Albert scale free networks
(Barabasi & Albert,1999), and Watts-Strogatz small-world model (Watts & Strogatz,
1998), and a realistic case study of a water distribution system. The results of these
experiments concluded that the small-world phenomenon (Milgram, 1967;
Watts,1998) attributed in the difficulty of removing cascading failures by service
agents because disruptions are more difficult to be removed if they propagate to
interlinked clusters. A better and more efficient collaboration between the service
teams (through training, etc.) can improve the improve response performance to
certain upper boundary dictated by the availability of service team resources.
Meanwhile, the neuroplasticity-inspired protocol was able significantly reduce the
total number of failures, distance travelled by repair agents, and latency compared to
First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) scheduling protocols. The ABP can be applied to any
client network, while ALs can only be applied to reconfigurable client networks with
acceptable reconfiguration costs.
2. Furniture Manufacturing (Candranegara, Zhong, and Nof, 2015)
Conflicts and human/machine errors (CE) between operations can propagate and
leads inferior products in a furniture manufacturing systems. The N2N challenge in
this system is how to efficiently allocate CE detection agents along the production line.
Since these resources requires collaboration and services are interdepended, this
problem can be solved by a DLOC model. Allocation of inspection resources (the
server network) to the manufacturing stations (client network) for efficient detection,
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prevention, and recovery of CEs were conducted by the measuring eigenvector
centrality of each stations (network nodes) with respect to historical occurrence of
CEs and the influence the station to other stations. Two scenarios are simulated:
inspection by humans or by emerging autonomous systems. Experiment shows that
the developed method increases CEPD performance with statistically significance by
reducing the time to completion compared with the decentralized method (allocating
resources to every stations), and increasing the preventability and reliability while
reducing the rectification cost compared with the centralized method (allocating
resources at the end of process). This case study validates the DLOC model in a
manufacturing client network.

2.2

Graph Theory and Network Science Problems

2.2.1 Review of Graph Theoretical Analysis in Complex Networks
The studies of network to model real-world problems came as early in the 17th century by
Leonard Euler. His mathematical description vertices (nodes) and edges that builds
network of Konigsberg bridge laid foundation to graph theory. The study of Graph theory
does not directly translate into the study of network science and complex network, where
the latter focuses on more of the applied application of graph theory tools to model and
analyze real-world networks. Initially, real-world networks were thought to be random in
their topology, as exemplified by the Erdos-Renyi random graph (Erdos & Renyi, 1959,
1960). In the late 1990s, further advances in network science have found that real-world
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networks have power-law degree distribution (Barabasi & Albert, 2002), which is not true
in random networks that have Poisson degree distribution. Other attributes that were
observed were the existence of short links connecting distant part of the network, but
still maintain relative local interconnection (clustering). This attribute was later dubbed
as the “small-world” property (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Both of these attributes became
canonical for network case-studies where they represented by the scale-free network
(Barabasi & Albert, 2002) and small-world network (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).
The study of robustness of networks against perturbation has become attractive lately,
mostly related to complex system designs. The common properties measured in studying
the robustness of a network are average geodesic length and size of giant component. It
has been found that scale-free networks have high degree of robustness against random
failure, but extremely vulnerable to failure in its hubs (Albert et al., 2000). The prevalence
of community and modularity also effects networks robustness (Newman, 2006; Tran &
Kwon, 2013). Modularity is negatively correlated with network robustness. The study of
network robustness has also motivated in the development of new network centrality
measures (Freeman, 1977). One particularly new centrality measure is the bridge
centrality (Hwang et al., 2006). The Bridge centrality has interesting potential of
effectively detecting bridging edges & nodes which connects different network modules.
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2.2.2 Prior Research Works Related to Cascading Failures in Complex Networks and
Vulnerability
It has been observed that real-world CPIs exhibits the characteristics of a cascading failure
under perturbation. A profound example of this is the blackout of power grids which
happened recently in the USA (Kadloor & Santh; 2010). The significance of this
phenomena is that due to cascading failure, a single element failure may result into
catastrophic consequence.
The analysis and modelling of cascading failure has only been available in the recent
decade. There are two main school of thoughts for modelling cascades in complex
networks: the load-based and the threshold-based. The former, load-based method, is
based on the concept of dynamical redistribution of flow in networks (Crucitti et. al.,
2004). This model commonly used to analyze the cascading dynamics in networks where
the elements are subjected to loads, i.e. power grid, water distribution networks (Lv et.
al.,2014; Shuang et. al., 2015; Shuang et. al., 2014). However, we will not focus our
research in this method since it is not being used by the DLOC. The threshold-based model
is developed based on considering the diffusion of information or propaganda in social
networks, where each individual’s state depends on its neighbors (Granovetter, 1978;
Watts, 2002). Under this model, global cascade or full-size cascade occurs according to
“cascade window” which varies according to the average degree and threshold value. In
the initial model, cascade is triggered by a single failing nodes and the rest will also fail if
the threshold is met. Further application of this model has resulted in a number of
generalization in different networks. In social contagion (viruses, information, innovation),
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a generalized model of has been made by integrating interdependent interaction models
(Dodds & Watts, 2004). The model has also been generalized using analytical approach in
modular networks (Gleeson, 2008), degree-correlated networks (Dodds et. al., 2009), and
networks with adjustable clustering (2011). It has also been studied that different failure
initiator selection and number would influence the final size of cascade (Singh et al., 2013).
This mode threshold lends some similarity with other social contagion models such as the
SIS model, where both models consider the fraction of “failure” neighbors to determine
a node’s probability of becoming fault (Dodds & Watts, 2004). In information diffusion
theory, sociologists have long argued that “bridges” between disjoint community clusters
promotes the diffusion of information or diseases (Granovetter, 1973). This was further
confirmed by the small-world network model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) where links
between otherwise distant nodes are created by rewiring that of a regular graph. It was
found that disease infection spreads much easier and quickly in this network.
Nevertheless, the type of cascade assumed in the aforementioned studies were simple
propagation; one “fail” neighbor is sufficient to transmit information or tilt the status of
its neighbor into “fail” as well. The other type of cascade is the complex propagation
where it takes a minimum threshold of neighbors in “fail” status allow a given adopting
the same “fail” status as well (Granovetter, 1978). Both of these cascade types are
addressed in the Watts Global Cascade Threshold model by adjusting the cascade
threshold (Watts, 2002). Complex propagation typically unfolds in clustered networks or
within cluster modules of networks. This was exemplified in the studies of recruitment
patterns for social movements; they are typically effective in locally dense network of
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relationship (McAdam, 1986; McAdam et al., 1993). For complex propagation, it was
shown “bridges” or random edges connecting node clusters can actually inhibit the
cascade growth process (Centola et al., 2007). In fact, another studies proved that the
occurrence of connected clusters in networks are the only obstacles to cascades (Easley
&

Kleinberg,

2010).

Specifically,

given

the

cascade

threshold

is 𝑞𝑞 ,

a

failure/disease/information cannot propagate into a different node cluster if given the
next node cluster has a clustering density (coefficient) greater than 1 − 𝑞𝑞.

Despite there have been many advances in study of cascading failures in complex
networks, there hasn’t been any research with the integration of DLOC model. The DLOC
is a new class of research problems in the emerging e-Work systems; past findings and
research regarding cascade behavior can be applied to DLOC-CDR to aid in developing
quick design guidelines for disruption responders in CPI networks.

2.2.3 Prior Research Works Related to Disruption Mitigation and Control
Previous works in network disruption mitigation and control can be broadly grouped into
two general directions. The first direction discusses about designing robust network
through identifying the critical elements of a network to maintain connectivity or
connectivity reliability; maintain single component connected graph topology. This
approach can also be implied as pre-disruption mitigation approach. The second approach,
although not completely exclusive of the first, discusses about post-disruption mitigation.
Prior works in identifying critical elements connectivity have mainly focused on the
application of design of sensor and radio communication networks. The minimum
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number of neighbors needed to maintain connectivity in a random radio network was
previously investigated through simulation (Ni & Chandler, 1994). This resulted the
“magic number” of minimum be neighbors to be three to eight. For wireless sensor
networks, the number is estimated as a logarithmic function of the total number of nodes
(Xue & Kumar, 2004). Subsequent research works develop these model by taking into
account of various conditions. For example, (Dong, et al., 2007) found the lower bound
probability of a wireless sensor network being connected under Rayleigh Fading as a
function of minimum node density. Connectivity properties was also studied large scale
sensor networks as a mean to optimize multi-path routing (Pishro-Nik, et al., 2009).
Another approach for pre-disruption mitigation is by providing redundancy. (Chen and
Nof, 2000; Chen, 2002) investigated genetic algorithms to be used in modelling low-cost
fault tolerant structure of Multi-Enterprise Networks. Inspired by the Fault Tolerance by
Teaming principle of CCT (Nof, 2007), a new design paradigm called Resilience by Teaming
(Reyes Levalle & Nof, 2015) has been validated on several supply networks to provide
better network resiliency under disruptions.
Connectivity reliability analysis has also been done on several other real-world networks.
In transportation networks, a research has been conducted to aid post-disaster road
network recovery decisions (Bin, et al., 2009). The road network was modeled as a
weighted flow graph, whereas the flow represents time-varying traffics, and by assessing
connectivity reliability of different recovery scenarios an optimal decision can be found
to minimize total travel time cost between each pairs of nodes. Optimal resource

25
allocation (cost) for partial road network recovery has also been investigated using
Lagrangian based heuristic algorithm (Liu & Qi, 2014).
Still under the category of pre-disruption mitigation strategies, other works have
investigated network design for self-healing telecommunication networks by utilizing
spare capacity planning. The network in these works are modeled as bi-directional
weighted networks having multiple commodities between different source and sink
nodes (multi-commodity flow problem). There are two main basic methods devised by
these works, namely line restoration and path restoration. Link restoration allocates
spare capacity to the links so that a faulty link’s flow can be rerouted through an alternate
path using the spare capacities of the links in the network (Veerasamy & Venkatesan,
1995). Other works under these methods have mainly focused on developing algorithms
and heuristics to compute optimal rerouting policy (Krishnamurthy, et al., 2003; Grover,
et al., 1991; Sakauchi, 1990). Path restoration on the other hand, considers each path
disrupted by the link failure separately and rerouted over an alternate path between the
source and sink nodes (Murakami & Kim, 1998; Doshi, et al., 1991; Grover, 2000). This
method, although requires more computation power, results in a more efficient spare
capacity planning. Research developments in pre-disruption mitigation strategies have
equipped network planner with better insight on the design of a more resilient client
network, especially in weighted networks (i.e. telecommunication networks). However,
the N2N challenges that DLOC addresses requires the properties of Online Service and
Cascading Failures (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016). These properties have not been
addressed in the aforementioned works.
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Post-disruption mitigation strategies research works are commonly found in protection
of vital infrastructure networks. In Water Distribution Networks (WDN), an emergency
model was developed to redistribute water pressure and flow to prevent cascading failure
due to overload (Shuang, et al., 2014). Nodes in the network represents water reservoirs,
consumers, and tanks, while edges represent pipes, pumps, and valves. The loads (flows)
are assumed to be dynamic, such that it will cause edge failure if exceeds the flow capacity.
In this model, external emergency resource exists to fix failed elements (nodes/edges)
and are triggered by a certain threshold. However, external resources here assumed to
be unlimited. Power grids utilizes a load shedding strategy to balance overall demands
with electricity availability. In this case, the power grid network is abstracted as a graph,
where the nodes represent buses (loads and generators) and edges represent electricity
lines (Xu & Girgis, 2001; Aponte & Nelson, 2006; Bevrani, et al., 2010). Another method is
proposed where the removing of “insignificant nodes” that a contribute more load to the
network than they handle is removed to reduce the size of cascading failure (Motter,
2004). There are still several other works not mentioned here which also discusses about
post-disruption mitigation strategy. However, for the interest of conciseness, the
literature survey presented here have fairly represented the general types of work
previously done.
In summary, the post-disruption mitigation strategies presented gives a robust method
to mitigate disruptions, especially for client network control during disruption. However,
they have not yet included the external service network aspect of the DLOC.
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2.2.4 Prior Research Works Related to Service Resource Allocation and Network
Component Protection Priority
Service resource allocation problems found in previous works are commonly related to
facility location problem or k-center problem in graph theory. Given a weighted network,
this problem is concerned with optimal placement of facilities to minimize transportation
cost across the network. There has been copious amount of research in this problem and
exact and approximate algorithms have been found to fine the optimal placement
(Current, et al., 1990). A subset of this problem deals not only with minimizing cost, but
also maximizing coverage; the common name for these set problem the maximum
coverage/shortest path problem (Current, et al., 1985). Location and covering problems
in undirected and directed flow networks have been studied in (Tamura, et al., 1990;
Tamura, et al., 1992), the optimal solution of both of these problems can be obtained in
polynomial time. Resource allocation (facility location) for post-disaster management also
requires the facility to have maximum coverage on the affected area with respect to
minimum routing cost (Viswanath & Peeta, 2002). One of the key element in this work
was the resource constraint on the number of resources to be deployed vs minimum cost
routing which was solved using integer programming. A sensor location problem in traffic
networks have also been investigated to find the minimum number of sensors such that
information on flow volume in specific path can be obtained (Gentili & Mirchandani,
2005). The maximal coverage/shortest path problem aligns with resource allocation
problems applied in DLOC, where server have to be initially positioned in nodes that
minimizes overall expected routing cost as well having maximum coverage of the network
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in terms of group allocation. However, the approach employed on this problem cannot
be directly adopted to the collaborative disruption response problem in DLOC. As stated
in (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) the positioning of server agents in client networks
also functions as error prevention on the supervised nodes/links. Thus, there is another
objective of maximally positioning the server agents to protect important nodes.
Due to cascade of overload failure, the highly heterogeneous distribution of loads of realworld network makes them vulnerable to attacks such that an avalanche of failure nodes
(cascading) may occur by disabling a single (or several) key nodes (Motter & Lai, 2002). A
better protection strategy of client network can be developed by also taking into account
this fact, i.e. priority protection on vulnerable nodes. Several research works have
dedicated to investigate network survivability under the failure of these set of nodes and
identify them for priority protection. (Cruciti, et al., 2004) showed that in weighted
networks, the vulnerable nodes are the ones with the largest load. In fiber infrastructure
network, a polynomial time algorithm has been developed to simulate several node
failures (single or set) to identify the vulnerable nodes (Neumayer, et al., 2011).
Vulnerable nodes in directed water distribution network where identified by assessing
the ratio between discrepancy of failures cascade & direct failure and total number of
initial node (Shuang, et al., 2014). The previously aforementioned works have
investigated node vulnerability under the consideration of cascading overload failures,
typically in flow networks. Notwithstanding the importance of flow continuum in
networks, vulnerable nodes can also be identified by analyzing the network topological
structure. Several measures graph (network) centrality measures have been developed,
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including degree centrality and betweenness centrality (Freeman,1977; Borgatti, 2005;
Newman, 2001). Nevertheless, these previous centrality measures are dominated by
elements’ degree due. A newly developed measure, named bridging centrality measures,
aims to identify the most important component in the networks by exploiting graph
properties of cut edges/vertices and clustering (Hwang et al., 2006). Cut vertices/edges
denotes the elements of a graph (network) where if removed would increase the number
of connected components. This essential in real-world networks which mainly exhibits a
modularity structure (Newman, 2006).
In summary, previous research works related service resource allocation and network
component protection priority have given significant contribution in understanding the
failure dynamics and protection of complex network. Nevertheless, these two areas are
still disaggregated in approaching collaborative disruption response – although they both
hold important findings to improve collaborative disruption response. Thus, in the
following chapter we will try to improve the service allocation protocol in DLOC by taking
into account both the optimal service allocation as well as differentiated network
component protection priority.
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CHAPTER 3.

GRAPH –THEORETIC PROPERTY ANALYSIS OF DLOC

This chapter is dedicated for RQ1. We will revisit the results of previous research works
on DLOC (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) and use tools from graph theory to develop
inferences and quick guidelines for the design of disruption response operation in CPI
network. The main contribution of this chapter is to find a general pattern of graph
(network) properties which can approximate and explain the results of the DLOC
experiments on conceptual networks and validate it on real-world CPI networks. The
conceptual networks that will be used in this research are Erdos-Renyi Random Network
(ER), Barabasi-Albert Scale-free Network (BA), and Watts-Strogaz Small-world Network
(WS).

3.1

Phase Transition for Probability of Recoverability (𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 )

The threshold cascade model of the DLOC has been observed to display a phase transition
phenomenon governed by the critical value of cascade threshold (𝜑𝜑), average degree
�������
(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺 ), and failure initiator fraction (𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹0 ) at which beyond the critical mark, a global

cascade first commence (Watts, 2002; Singh, 2013). Global cascade is defined as cascade
size covering >90% of the networks elements. Motivated by this phenomena, we
hypothesize that there’s exist a certain regime where the probability of a CPI network
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(under the DLOC model) to fully recover from a cascading disruption is strictly less than 1,
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 <1, and vice versa. Our initial analysis presumes that it is governed by the

�������
disruption responder team size (|𝐴𝐴|), average degree (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺 ), and cascade threshold (𝜑𝜑)

– while keeping the failure initiator fraction (𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹0 ) fixed at certain value. We will be

validating this hypothesis numerically by using the TIE-DLOC simulator on conceptual
networks and a power grid network.
3.2

Probability of Recovery from Cascade (𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ) in DLOC

In the presence of cascading failures, the client network, according to the DLOC model,
will request service to the server network (disruption responders) to start the recovery
process from failures. The resiliency of client CPI network to recover from impending
disruption is addressed in DLOC by the Recoverability 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 metric (Zhong & Nof, 2015;
Zhong, 2016). It can be formulated as:

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃(|𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 | = 0, 𝑡𝑡 > 0)

(3.1)

Where |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 | denotes the dynamic cascading failure size at time t. The realization of
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 from the TIE-DLOC simulator is an average value over the number of replications.
3.3

Analysis and Assumptions

Analytical models have been developed predict the average cascade size for threshold
model in different networks. (Watts, 2002; Dodds & Watts, 2004; Gleeson, 2008; Hackett
et al., 2011). Let 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 denote the subset of nodes in 𝐺𝐺(𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸) which has already been
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infected by the cascading failure (cascade size) at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ⊂ 𝑁𝑁. By construction of the

Watts threshold model, |𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 | > |𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 | holds only if there exist a node 𝑣𝑣, 𝑣𝑣 ∉ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 adjacent
1

with at least one node in 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 and has a degree (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑣𝑣)) ≤ � �. We proceed to call these
𝜑𝜑

nodes which has potential to propagate failures as vulnerable nodes.

Several additional assumptions are applied to this study to limit the scope of analysis:
1. Disruption responder team formation
We assumed a fixed the number of disruption responder team |𝐴𝐴| to be 0.07*|𝑁𝑁|.

Furthermore, it is assumed that each agent has the ability to collaborate with 1/3
of the disruption responder team, or 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 (𝐴𝐴) =

2. Edges of client network

|𝐴𝐴|
3

.

Although the adopted Watts threshold Cascade Model in DLOC takes into account
of failures involving the edges of the network, we concede that this will not be
taken into account. It can be argued that this will not influence the analysis
significantly since the failure state of the edges depend solely on its adjacent
nodes.
3. Failure initiator (𝐹𝐹0 )

For all network tested, we assume that initial failures occur randomly on 5 client
network nodes.

4. Disruption Responder Allocation
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The disruption responder agents will initially be allocated to the nodes of client
network with the highest betweennnes centrality value. This method is known as
the Centralit-Based Depot Allocation, CBA (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016).

We proceed by presenting two hypotheses that can approximate the phase transition of
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 :

Hypothesis 3.1
�������
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 >

1

𝜑𝜑

→ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1

(3.2)

By the construction of the Watts threshold cascade model, we hypothesized that the
expected degree of node should be more than the reciprocal threshold cascade 𝜑𝜑.
Hypothesis 3.2
𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 = ∑𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(𝑘𝑘) 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 < 0.70 → 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1
1

𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(𝑘𝑘) = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑘𝑘 ≤ � �, 0 otherwise
𝜑𝜑

(3.3)
(3.4)

We denote that if the fraction vulnerable nodes (𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ) is less than 0.70, then the

network has a probability of 1 to recover from disruption. 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 denotes the probability that
a node has a degree 𝑘𝑘, while 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(𝑘𝑘) is binary variable conditioned on whether a node with

a degree 𝑘𝑘 is vulnerable based on the threshold cascade. This relation is not bidirectional.
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3.4

Experiment: TIE-DLOC Simulation

We validate Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2 through numerical simulation using TIE-DLOC
simulation software. The data set is divided into two groups, namely conceptual networks
and real-world networks. The latter consist of three different conceptual networks: ErdosRenyi Random Network (ER), Barabasi-Albert Scale-free (BA), and Watts-Strogatz Small
world (WS). Each network will have 2 combinations of |𝑁𝑁| and �����
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 summarized in Table
3.1. Each network will also be tested on varying cascade threshold (𝜑𝜑): 0.25 and 0.4.
Table 3.1 Combination of |N| and �����
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺 for conceptual network

Combination

Number of Nodes |𝑁𝑁|

1

500

4

2

1000

6

�����𝐺𝐺 )
Average Degree (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

The real-world network will be represented by a network model of the USA Western
States Power Grid (PW). There are 4941 nodes in this network connected by 6594 edges.
The average degree of this network is 2.67 (Watts & Storgatz, 1998). For the real-world
network, the threshold cascade will be set at 0.25 and 0.4.
The simulation result is summarized in Table 3.2. A general pattern can be inferred from
this result is that 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 correlates negatively with 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 with a strong correlation.

This is justifiable by the fact that 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 correlates positively with total cascade size

𝐹𝐹.

35
Hypothesis 3.1 is negated by the fact that it does not applies on all experiment results.
1

�����𝐺𝐺 is equal to , i.e.
Specifically, on experiments no. (1) and (5), the average degree 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝜑𝜑

�����𝐺𝐺 =4 for 𝜑𝜑 = 0.25, but 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is 1. We also conclude that the approximation
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

proposed in Hypothesis 3.1 is risk-averse due to the fact that it underestimated the result
of experiments (1) and (5). Nevertheless, this approximation can be a quick guideline for
decision makers and designers to know the resiliency of their network without too much
of analysis beforehand because it only requires the input of average degree and expected
threshold cascade.
Hypothesis 3.2 is found to be valid in all set of experiments. All networks that have
𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 < 0.70 has a probability 1 of recovering from a cascading failure. One

important note is that by construction of the hypothesis we impose a logical relation of
𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 < 0.70 would produce 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1, but not the other way around (not
bidirectional). Thus, experiment (5) still applies to this hypothesis.

A caveat of this experiment is the interesting pattern found in small-world networks (WS).
Results past experiment of DLOC have found that the WS to be the most vulnerable
compared to ER and BA (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016). The same setup of this
experiment was used for experiment no (1), (5), and (9). However, it can be seen when 𝜑𝜑

is changed to 0.4, WS has the lowest 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 among ER and BA. This implies that the

vulnerability statute has changed. This result also complies with the findings that “bridges”
or “shortcuts” found in small-world networks actually inhibits the spread of complex
propagation (Centola et al., 2006) – as 𝜑𝜑 ≫, propagation becomes more complex because
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it requires more neighbors to influence change of state. Finally, we also conject that exact
numerical relation between 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 , i.e. relation in regards to exact

numerical value, is dependent on the different network topology. This can be seen by
comparing experiment no (5) and (9) where the former has higher 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 than

experiment (9) but higher 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 as well. Both network have different threshold of
𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 to allow 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 to phase into 1.
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No

Network

Table 3.2 Experiment Result for 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 based on average of 50 replications
Cascade

Number of

Fraction of Vulnerable

Average

Probability of Recovery

Threshold

Nodes

(𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 )

�����𝐺𝐺 )
Degree (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

4

1

(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 )

1

ER

0.25

500

0.632

2

ER

0.25

1000

0.292

6

1

3

ER

0.40

500

0.252

4

1

4

ER

0.40

1000

0.065

6

1

5

BA

0.25

500

0.782

4

1

6

BA

0.25

1000

0.596

6

1

7

BA

0.40

500

0.488

4

1

8

BA

0.40

1000

0

6

1

9

WS

0.25

500

0.72

4

0.96

10

WS

0.25

1000

0

6

1
37

38

11

WS

0.40

500

0.058

4

1

12

WS

0.40

1000

0

6

1

13

PG

0.25

4941

0.88

2.67

0.9

14

PG

0.4

4941

0.58

2.67

1

38
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CHAPTER 4.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION POLICY FOR PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE
NETWORK ELEMENTS

Advances in network science have found that networks found in real world have varying
properties which cannot be modeled by a classical random graph (Watts & Strogatz, 1998;
Barabasi & Albert, 1999). Some of these properties that are prominent in man-made CPIs
networks includes power-law degree distribution due to evolutionary networks (growing
networks) with preferential attachments, small-world properties which elucidates the
“six-degree of separation” phenomena and shorter average paths (Barabasi & Albert,
1999; Watts & Strogatz, 1998; Dorogovtsev & Mendes; 2002). These properties have an
inherent impact on the heterogeneity of the network elements which also has an effect
to how network respond to disruption (tolerance). For example, it is found that CPI
networks having scale-free behavior has higher disruption tolerance against random
errors but vulnerable against disruption to the network centralities which plays important
roles in maintaining connectivity. The DLOC-CDR further elucidates this by assuming that
CPI networks maintain cascading failure behavior disruption occurrence. Thus, if a failure
happens to one of the vulnerability points, the results would be even more catastrophic.
This chapter’s focus will start from addressing the vulnerable points fact to create a better
resource allocation policy for DLOC-CDR operations in CPIs under the DLOC model.
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Compared to previous research in DLOC (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016), we
hypothesize that disruption responders must be allocated to the most vulnerable parts of
the networks, such that preventing them ever to fail initially, as opposed to allocating
based on reachability or shortest paths. An analysis of error vulnerability, therefore, will
be conducted based on several targeted failures selection heuristics. The result of this
analysis is expected to provide initial insights and further reinforce the hypothesis above
to guide the development of the of a new and better resource allocation policy.

4.1

Vulnerable Points of Network

The objective of this study is to elucidate the effect of targeted failures in CPI networks
using conceptual complex networks models and gain insight on vulnerability points of
network. As mentioned before, we will use the insight gained from this study as a
guideline in developing a better resource allocation policy which takes into consideration
of prioritizing protection of vulnerable network elements (nodes & edges). The conclusion
of this study will highlight the effectiveness of proposed network centrality measures in
identifying vulnerable network elements; measured by average cascade size and speed
with respect to differing network properties.

4.1.1 Design of Study
Vulnerability denotes the decrease of network performance due to random or selected
removals of nodes and edges (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). In this research, we define
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vulnerability points of the network as a set of nodes (and edges) whose removal will
maximize cascading failure effect within the network, although not necessarily result in a
global cascade (Watts, 2002). Ideally we would require detail knowledge of the whole
network topology to locate and pinpoint each vulnerable set of network elements. This is
a tedious and time-consuming process.

A more manageable choice is to look upon

network centrality heuristics, which will also be the base of our newly improved resource
allocation policy.
Network centrality reveals the importance of an element (node or edge) within the whole
network, and many centrality measures have been developed based on structural
information of the network (Borgati, 2005; Lee, 2012). For this research, we will compare
three different centrality measures as explained below:
1. Betweenness Centrality (Freeman, 1977)
This centrality measures the share of times that all shortest paths pass through the
node being measured. The betweenness centrality value of node 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 can be
expressed as:

𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠≠𝑖𝑖≠𝑡𝑡

𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (𝑖𝑖)

𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

(4.1)

Where 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the number of shortest paths from node 𝑠𝑠 to 𝑡𝑡 and 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (𝑖𝑖) is the number
of shortest paths from node 𝑠𝑠 to 𝑡𝑡 that passes through 𝑖𝑖. Previous research on DLOC

(Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) have applied this centrality measure as a heuristic
for resource allocation policy under the CBA policy. It has also been proven to yield a
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better result on all dimensions of DLOC performance metrics (Time, failure, distance,
and preventability) compared to random allocation.
2. Degree Centrality (Freeman, 1978; Newman, 2004)
The degree centrality measures the share number of edges connected to the node
being measured. For a given node 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, the degree centrality can be mathematically
expressed as:

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 =

deg(𝑖𝑖)

(4.2)

|𝐸𝐸|

Where deg(𝑖𝑖) is the degree of node 𝑖𝑖 and |𝐸𝐸| is the total number of edges of graph 𝐺𝐺.

3. Bridge Centrality (Hwang et. al, 2006; Nanda & Kotz, 2012)

A bridge node or edge is a network component which connects two modular structure
(connected components) in a graph network. They are commonly known as cut
vertices or edges (Bondy & Murty, 2008). If a bridge node or edges fails, it will have
higher probability to reduce the connected network into a disconnected network and
increase the number of connected components. This arguably causes higher damage
to the central network with more nodes losing connection to each other. Bridging
centrality of a node and edge are defined in Eq. (4.3) below:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 . 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝑖𝑖)

(4.3)

Where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 denotes the bridging centrality of node 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 of client network 𝐺𝐺 . The

bridging centrality of node 𝑖𝑖 then is regarded as the product of its betweenness

centrality (𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ) and bridging coefficient (𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝑖𝑖) ).

The bridging coefficient of a node

43
determines the extent how well node is located between high degree nodes. It is
defined as below:
𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝑖𝑖) =

deg(𝑖𝑖)−1

1
𝑖𝑖 deg(𝑗𝑗)

∑𝑗𝑗∈𝑅𝑅

(4.3)

Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the set of neighbors of node 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁.

Three conceptual network models are selected in this research to represent different
characteristics of observable network properties, they are Erdos-Renyi Random Network
(ER), Barabasi-Albert Scale-free Network (BA) and Watt-Strogatz Small-world Network
(WS). The unique characteristics of each model is the result of their differing generating
mechanism. The ER model is generated by connecting nodes randomly. Each pair of nodes
in the graph has a probability 𝑝𝑝 to be connected with an edge and independent with every
other pair. By probabilistic methods, the expected number of edges of an ER network

𝑁𝑁
𝐺𝐺(𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸) is � � 𝑝𝑝. The resulting degree distribution of this network will be a Gaussian
2

bell-shaped curve, implying the ER network has low heterogeneity in node degree. This

degree distribution tends to be unrealistic when modelling real-world networks (Albert &
Barabasi, 2002). The ER network also has average geodesic length and clustering
coefficient which are shorter and lower, respectively, compared to most real-world
networks. Regardless of its shortcoming, the ER model is widely used a benchmark for
comparison with other network model.
The other two network models, BA and WS, were developed to fill in the network
property gap that the ER model had compared to real-world networks. The BA model
generates network with the power law degree distribution (“scale-free”) by using a
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preferential attachment mechanism. Many real-world networks were observed to have
power-law degree distribution and thus this model was established (Barabasi & Albert,
1999). The BA model has low clustering coefficient which scales to zero as 𝑁𝑁 → ∞. Finally,

the WS model generates a network with high clustering coefficient and low average
geodesic length. This is achieved by rewiring the nodes of a regular ring lattice with a
specified probability. The shortcoming of this models is it tends to produce an unrealistic
degree distribution due to its ring lattice structure. Nevertheless, this model successfully
replicates the “small-world effect” in which the average geodesic length of the network
scales proportionally with the logarithm of nodes (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). This effect is
known to be prevalent in many social networks. Both the BA and WS model also maintain
a hub-spoke architecture, although WS has a higher modularity.
As mentioned in the beginning of this research, the error propagation in this study will be
modeled using an adopted Watts Threshold model (Watts, 2002). All nodes and edges –
except a handful of initiators - will initially be in normal state “0” and will convert to
failure state “1” if the threshold fraction, 𝜑𝜑, of neighbors in state “1” is reached. Based

on this model, we will evaluate the number of network components (nodes and edge)
that are induced to state “1” by error propagation from initiator nodes over time (hours)
and without repair.
Complex networks display a high degree of error tolerance against random attack, but are
prone to targeted attack on their important nodes. (Albert et al., 2000; Cruciti et al., 2002).
Furthermore, a recent study on threshold-limited error spread (propagation) to ER
networks has found that selecting initiator node based on degree centrality will yield a
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higher average error propagation compared to random selection (Singh et al., 2013).
Therefore, we claim the random selection method of initiator node will not perform
better than the three centrality methods (Degree, Betweenness and Bridge) that has been
proposed earlier in this study. By conjecture, this claim is also more apparent in BA and
WS networks since the former has a power law degree distribution – a small number of
nodes are connected to most of the other nodes - and the latter owes to its high
clustering coefficient; both properties implies some component within the network is
more important than the others. We further establish several hypotheses that are to be
verified in this study.
Hypothesis 4.1
Failures initiated on a set of nodes with high degree centrality would yield a higher
average and total cascading failure size compared to failures initiated on the same
number of nodes with high betweenness centrality. Let |𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼) | and |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼) | be the total

number of failures on the network at the end of cascade process and dynamic size of
cascading failure at time 𝑡𝑡, respectively, triggered by failures of nodes having the highest
𝛼𝛼 centrality. This hypothesis can be expressed as:

|𝐹𝐹(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) | ≥ |𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) |

|𝐹𝐹(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) | ≥ |𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) |

(4.4)
(4.5)

With Eq. (4.4) & (4.5) having possibility of maintaining equality depending average degree
of the network. This observation is supported by past studies which found that within the
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network same network size (number of nodes) and type, varying average degree affects
the cascading behavior of different centrality-based initiator (Singh et al., 2013).
This hypothesis can be theoretically verified by the construction of the Watts Threshold
Cascade model. A node will change its state to “1” if the fraction of its neighbor adopting
state “1” exceeds the fraction 𝜑𝜑. Thus, a node’s degree (number of neighbors assuming
no looping edges) plays an essential role in determining cascade failure tolerance of a
given node. As a consequence, high-degree node (high degree centrality nodes) are
harder to influence by cascading failures. The degree centrality heuristics will select highdegree centrality nodes as error initiator for the cascading failure process. Based on the
previous arguments, these nodes are the ones harder to influence by normal propagation
and, by the virtue of high degree, are capable of influencing larger number of nodes with
lower average degree - more prone to cascading failure.
Hypothesis 4.2
The WS network model would be more vulnerable by error initiated on high bridge
centrality nodes compared to betweenness centrality node. This hypothesis can be
expressed as:
|𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) | ≥ |𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) |

|𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) | ≥ |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) |, ∀𝑡𝑡 > 0

(4.6)
(4.7)

The same argument on equality for Eq. (4.4) also applies for Eq. (4.6). On the contrary to
BA, the WS has high clustering coefficient which by construction we deduce is suitable for
the bridge centrality to find bridging nodes between clusters.
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4.1.2 Experiment: Simulation Result
The objective of this experiment is to compare the effectiveness of the three selected
network centrality heuristics on pin-pointing vulnerable parts of the network with respect
to the conceptual network models. The metrics that will be evaluated in this experiment
are the total number of failures, |𝐹𝐹|, and dynamic size cascading failure over time 𝑡𝑡, |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 |.

We assume that the three conceptual networks have the same number nodes, |𝑁𝑁| =
500. The average degree, ������
deg𝐺𝐺 , of the client network 𝐺𝐺(𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸) will be varied within

certain range to overcome bias of differing network formation due to degree variation.

The cascading threshold 𝜑𝜑 is set to 0.2 and cascading failure process is initiated by
selecting and turning 5 nodes into failure state “1” based on the centrality heuristics. We
limit the observations of the experiment up to 30 time units (hours).
Figure 4.1 summarizes the experiment result measured by Fraction of failures 𝑆𝑆 which is

obtained by dividing total number of failures |𝐹𝐹| with the total number of nodes |𝑁𝑁| and

edge |𝐸𝐸|. In general, all conceptual network with degree centrality failure exhibits a
pattern of “global cascade window” (Watts, 2002; Watts, 2007). The “global cascade
������
window” is an intermediate range of deg
𝐺𝐺 where global cascades are realized.

Hypothesis 4.1 generally applies to all of the tested networks. For BA scale-free network,
the degree centrality heuristic outperforms the betweenness centrality heuristics when
the average degree is small but equalizes as the average degree scales, which implies
nodes of both centrality overlap each other in that region. This overlapping phenomenon
between centrality and betweenness heuristics can be explained by several attributes of
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the BA scale-free network: (1) High-degree hub nodes, existent due to power-law
distribution, connects a large number of small-degree node which allows short path
length between these nodes by traversing through the hubs. The hub nodes,
consequently, have high fraction of shortest paths going through them. This becomes
more profound as the hubs are connected to more nodes as a function of the average
degree (Albert & Barabasi, 2002; Cohen & Havlin, 2003) (2) The BA scale-free networks
and networks with scale-free degree distributions in general shows high correlation
between their degree and betweenness centrality values; the higher degree, the higher
the betweennesss (Holme et al., 2002). The aforementioned arguments may underline
the superiority of the degree centrality compared to the betweenness centrality with
respect to the objective of this study. However, it can also be seen on Figure 4.2(a) that
the degree centrality failure propagates faster throughout the network compared to the
betweennes centrality in within the low degree range, albeit the same final cascade size.
Real-world CPIs networks tend to have low average degrees, e.g. Power grid (Watts and
Strogatz, 1998). Thus, this low average degree range is crucial for applications in DLOCCDR. On the other hand, the low performance that the bridge centrality yields in BA
networks may be attributed to its construction. The bridging coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝑖𝑖) is a

multiplier to the betweeenness centrality value, which values highly nodes that are within
the intersection of high degree nodes. This is, however, counter-intuitive with regards to
the network topology of the BA network for cascading failure. Cascading failure initiated
from these bridge nodes have low probability of influencing (fulfilling the threshold
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fraction 𝜑𝜑) of the much higher degree hubs to change state, i.e. other nodes are miniscule

in terms of degree compared to the hub. BA network also tend to have low clustering
coefficient which causes “bottlenecks” during failure propagation to other members of
the hub cluster, i.e. minimum/no edge-disjoint paths between bridge centrality and hub

cluster (Figure 4.3). In conclusion, these arguments lead to the fact that among the
network centralities tested the degree centrality most effectively identify the
vulnerability points in BA scale-free networks.
Both hypothesis 4.1 and 4.2 applies for the result of WS small world network (Figure
4.1(a)). The degree centrality displays its superiority compared to the two others
centrality measures, which verifies the theoretical proof of hypothesis 4.1. The
performance of betweenness centrality and bridge centrality seem to follow a same
pattern of performance within a given range of average degree. Nevertheless, the bridge
centrality performs equally or better on all of tested average degree range compared to
betweenness centrality, which also verifies hypothesis 4.2. It is concluded that the degree
centrality and bridge centrality more effectively identify the vulnerability points in WS
small world networks compared to betweenness centrality.
For the ER random network, both heuristics (between and degree) perform equally well
when average degree is small. This is because the constructed network only consists of
small clusters without a giant component (Bollobas, 1984). Thus, spread is localized only
to those small clusters and the rest follows the “global cascade window” phenomenon
(Watts, 2002; Watts, 2007). The experimental result on this network also verifies
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Hypothesis 4.1 in terms of the superiority of the degree centrality compared to the others

Fraction of Failures - S

(see Figure 4.1(c) and 4.2(b)).
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Figure 4.1 Cascade Failure Size 𝑆𝑆 as a function of average degree for different selection
heuristics
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(b) ER Random Network
Figure 4.2 Dynamic Cascade Failure size |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 |as a function of time 𝑡𝑡 for different selection
heuristics and average degree 1 and 3

Figure 4.3 Failure propagation from bridge centrality node (colored red) reaches
bottleneck to neighboring clusters in BA
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4.2

DLOC Model Simulation: Conceptual Networks

In this section, we will use the insights gained from section 4.1 on vulnerability point of
network to analyze and develop a better resource allocation policy for collaborative
disruption response (CDR) operation under the DLOC model. In this regard, we will set
the current DLOC-CDR resource allocation policy as a baseline (will be explained later) and
failures will be initiated randomly throughout the simulation replication. It is assumed
that the CPI network will have 5 nodes as failure initiators. The TIE-DLOC software (Zhong
& Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) will be used to simulate the DLOC-CDR operation in this
experiment to numerically verify the results of the newly developed resource allocation
policy
The current resource allocation policy that DLOC-CDR uses, CBA, is based on the
betweenness centrality measure. The formulation of CBA is defined as below:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ∶ 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣, 𝐵𝐵𝑣𝑣 ≥ max(𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎 ) , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, 𝑣𝑣 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 ⊄ 𝐷𝐷
𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝐷

(4.8)
(4.9)

Where 𝐵𝐵𝑣𝑣 is the betweenness centrality of node 𝑣𝑣 and 𝐷𝐷 is the set nodes in 𝐺𝐺(𝑁𝑁, 𝐸𝐸)
which are set as depots (initial locations) for disruption responders (Zhong & Nof, 2015;

Zhong, 2016). CBA policy is a greedy heuristic to minimize response time by positioning
the service team depot nodes which are intersections of shortest paths. The performance
metric that will be measured by the TIE-DLOC simulator are:
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1. Total response time (𝑧𝑧) :
This metrics indicates response effectiveness of the responder team of 𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴, 𝑃𝑃).

Let 𝐹𝐹 be the set of disruption occurred within the network and 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 &𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 denotes the

timestamp when disruption 𝑖𝑖 is repaired and initial timestamp of disruption 𝑖𝑖,
respectively. The total response time 𝑧𝑧 can be formulated as:

2. Total Failures (|𝐹𝐹|):

𝑧𝑧 = ∑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 )

(4.10)

This metric indicates the total set of failed elements during the cascading failure
process.
3. Total distance travelled by responders (∆):

The total distance relates to the disruption responder agents’ movement within
the network to rectify failure/disruption; agents’ movement follows the network’s
topology, i.e. edge-node connection.

4. Preventability (𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ):

Preventability measures the impact of applying disruption response mechanism
to the network. Let 𝐹𝐹� denote the set of disruption that would have occurred
without a disruption response mechanism. Preventability can be formulated as:
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =

|𝐹𝐹� |−|𝐹𝐹|
|𝐹𝐹� |

(4.11)

The aforementioned performance metrics will help verify the effectiveness of the newly
developed resource allocation policy.
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The analysis and development of the new resource allocation policy will be divided into
three phases: (1) Experiment with static disruption responder team size, (2) Experiment
with varying disruption responder team size (3) Experiment with varying initial failure size.
We will compare the performance of three depot allocation heuristics (based on
centrality): Betweenness centrality (CBA), Degree Centrality (DBA), and Bridge Centrality
(BBA). The heuristics will be applied on the three conceptual networks previously tested:
ER, BA, and WS. These conceptual networks can approximate current emerging CPIs with
certain accuracies (Surana, et al., 2005; Yagan, et al., 2012; Chen & Nof, 2012). The second
and third phase will build upon the result of the first phase; only two allocation policies
will be tested per network, thus the first phase will act as a screening for the subsequent
phases.

4.2.1 Static Disruption Responder Team Size
From section 4.1, it can be concluded that different networks have differing set of
vulnerability points against cascading failures, as it was identified by their respective
centrality measures. Based on the selection of conceptual networks that were tested, it
can also be inferred that these discrepancies arise because of their inherent network
properties (e.g. clustering coefficient, degree distribution, path length, etc) that each of
these networks have – each conceptual network models a unique property that realworld networks have (Albert & Barabasi, 2002). Based on these findings, two hypothesis
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regarding DLOC-CDR performance are put forward to be verified by the TIE-DLOC
simulator.

Hypothesis 4.3:
The DBA policy will yield an improvement by decreasing maximum cascading failure 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

and increasing preventability 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 , but with a trade-off of increase in total response time
𝑧𝑧 or latency and total distance travelled responders ∆ compared to CBA. Let 𝑧𝑧(𝛼𝛼) ,
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼) and ∆(𝛼𝛼) denote the total latency, preventability, and total distance travelled

performance metrics result of TIE-DLOC simulation using 𝛼𝛼 resource allocation policy.
This hypothesis can be expressed as:

𝑧𝑧(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) − 𝑧𝑧(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) > 0

(4.12)

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) − 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) < 0

(4.14)

�𝐹𝐹(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) � − �𝐹𝐹(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) � < 0

(4.13)

∆(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) − ∆(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) > 0

(4.15)

Theoretically, the DBA policy will allocate depot to high degree nodes and based on the
vulnerability analysis from section 4.1 all of the tested conceptual networks generally
have their highest degree node as the vulnerable point of the network. Thus, by
protecting these nodes it is presumed that the cascading failure can be minimized
throughout the simulation replication if failures are initiated or propagates to these nodes.
However, the trade-off is the agents (depot) are not initially located within the track of
shortest path to most of the element within the network; as opposed to the CBA.
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Hypothesis 4.4:
The BBA policy in the WS small world network will yield improvements by decreasing
maximum cascading failure 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and increasing preventability 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 , but with a

considerable trade-off of increase in total response time 𝑧𝑧 or latency and total distance
travelled responders ∆ compared to CBA. This hypothesis can be expressed as:
𝑧𝑧(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) − 𝑧𝑧(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) > 0

(4.16)

�𝐹𝐹(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) � − �𝐹𝐹(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) � < 0

(4.18)

∆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) − ∆(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) > 0

(4.20)

𝑧𝑧(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) − 𝑧𝑧(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) < 0

(4.17)

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) − 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) < 0

(4.19)

∆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) − ∆(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) < 0

(4.21)

As it was shown in section 4.1, the bridge centrality (BBA) was able to identify vulnerability
points more effectively compared to betweenness centrality (CBA) in WS small world
network. Thus, we concede that this should apply as well in the DLOC model. On the other
hand, the BBA by construction also takes into consideration the betweenness centrality.
Therefore, it should have better performance in terms of latency and total travelling
distance compared to DBA.
The simulation parameters for this experiment parameters are summarized in Table 4.1.
In order for the results to be comparable, all three conceptual CPI networks have the
�������
same number of nodes |𝑁𝑁| and average degree 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺 . The disruption responder team
consist of 35 agents where each of them are able to collaborate with 4 other agents
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(degree of each agent). It is assumed that failures spread at the speed of 1 edge/hour,
while the agent’s travel speed 𝑣𝑣 is 1 edge/hour and the repair time 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is 1 hour. For
each conceptual network, there will be three scenarios based on the allocation policies

(CBA, BBA, DBA) and each scenario runs for 40 hours with 100 replications. The cascading
is initiated by selecting 5 random nodes to be switched to failure state “1”.
Table 4.1 Parameters for TIE-DLOC Simulation on Fixed Number of
|𝐴𝐴|

Parameter

Description

Value

Number of disruption responder agents

35

Degree for each agent

4

Agent’s traveling speed

1 edge/hour

Number of nodes in Client Network

500

Average degree of Client Network

4

Disruption repair timespan

1 hour

Cascade threshold

0.25

𝑢𝑢

Spread speed of propagating failures

1 edge/hour

Number of initial failures

5

𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅

Number of replication for simulation 100

|𝐴𝐴|

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑣𝑣

|𝑁𝑁|

�������
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺

𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜑𝜑

|𝐹𝐹0 |

𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

scenario
Simulation length for each scenario

40 hours
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Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 summarizes the measured performance metrics result of the
experiment while Figure 4.4 shows the disruption response behavior during the initial 40
hours. It can be seen that both hypothesis (4.3 & 4.4) have failed to explain the DLOCCDR simulation results. In terms of total failures |𝐹𝐹|, the DBA policy outperforms CBA
policy on all tested networks: (1) ER decreases by -10.05%, (2) BA decreases by -3.61%,

and (3) WS decreases by -14.71%, with an 80% statistical significance (based on twosample t-test). Increment percentage is calculated by subtracting CBA result from DBA
and divided by CBA result. This method will be used herein to denote performance
metrics increment percentage. These results also appear to be in correlation with the
vulnerability study in section 4.1. In all of the tested networks, the Degree centrality is
most effective in identifying vulnerable elements which translates to effectiveness of DBA
in reducing total failure. The performance gap between these two policies also follows a
similar trend from the vulnerable study results, e.g. BA performance increment is
marginal (<10%) where the vulnerability difference between Degree and Betweenness
centrality method is also marginal (see Figure 4.2.a).
DBA policy also outperforms CBA in terms of total latency 𝑧𝑧 : (1) ER decreases by -14.58%,

(2) BA decreases by -5.41%, and (3) WS decreases by -18.02% with an 80% statistical
significance (based on two-sample t-test). Again, the performance increment among
networks also follows the same pattern from result of the vulnerability study (section 4.1).

This result negates Hypothesis 4.3 by showing that total latency 𝑧𝑧 is also improved along

with the total failure |𝐹𝐹|. This also implies that there is a positive correlation between
these two metrics. Contrary to what has been researched earlier (Zhong & Nof, 2015;
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Zhong, 2016), this result also suggests the objective function of DLOC-CDR can be adjusted
to include total failure consideration.
The BBA policy performs the worst among the allocation policies in all tested networks.
Despite its breakthrough method in identifying bridging nodes and edges, we have to
concede that the it may not be suitable due to the performance metrics and failure model
(Watts threshold cascading model) used by the DLOC. It has been validated that the
Bridge Centrality is able to identify bridging elements which its removal will make the
network disconnected (Hwang et al., 2006). In real worlds CPI network this is a
catastrophic failure as it may halt flows or reachability to certain parts of the networks.
In the DLOC model, however, the performance metric only measures the total failure as
indicated by the state of elements (0 or 1), without regards to connectivity. This also
shows the drawback of the DLOC model in its inability to detect the connectivity state of
a network and maintain connectivity in the event of cascading disruption. This result also
negates the validity of Hypothesis 4.4 with a 60% statistical significance.
In general, we can conclude from the experiment results that the DBA outperforms the
CBA policy in all performance metrics on all of tested networks with an overall 80%
statistical significance (see Table 4.4 and 4.5). The extent of when this conclusion is valid
will be studied on the next section. Furthermore, we also conjecture two things.
Conjecture 4.1:
An a-priori vulnerability study on a network can foretell the performance of CBA and DBA
allocation policy under the DLOC-CDR model.
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Conjecture 4.2:
The effectiveness DBA (relative to CBA) to real-world CPI networks can be approximated
by comparing the similarity of network structural features to that of the conceptual
networks. For example, if a CPI network has an average geodesic length and clustering
coefficient almost the same as an WS small world network with the same size (node and
average degree) then effectiveness of each allocation policy (DBA and CBA) can be
approximated by the WS small world network.
Table 4.2 Experiment Results for Static Team Size – Total Latency (𝑧𝑧)

Network

CBA

BBA

DBA

Mean

STD.

Mean

STD.

Mean

STD.

ER

374.91

376.99

-

-

320.26

258.91

BA

253.48

182.69

837.54

1218.6

239.76

189.87

WS

1891.967

1729.29

2047.91

2082.1

1550.98

1443.21

Table 4.3 Experiment Results for Static Team Size – Total Failure (|𝐹𝐹|)
Network

CBA

BBA

DBA

Mean

STD.

Mean

STD.

Mean

STD.

ER

65.76

37.34

-

-

59.15

31.01

BA

54.35

27.65

100.55

85.54

52.39

28.25

WS

194.3

127.81

201.47

154.59

165.71

104.6
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Table 4.4 Statistical Significance of Total Latency (𝑧𝑧) Increment on two-sample t-test for
Static Team Size
Network

Increment from CBA to DBA

Increment CBA to BBA

Mean

SEM

p-value

Mean

SEM

p-value

ER

-54.65

33.61

0.106

-

-

-

BA

-13.72

10.82

0.207

584.06

125.07

0.000

WS

-340.99

154.40

0.028

155.94

102.74

0.131

Table 4.5 Statistical Significance of Total Failure (|𝐹𝐹|) Increment on two-sample t-test for
Static Team Size
Network

Increment CBA to DBA

Increment CBA to BBA

Mean

SEM

p-value

Mean

SEM

p-value

ER

-6.60

3.12

0.036

-

-

-

BA

-1.96

1.49

0.191

46.2

9.111

0.000

WS

-28.59

10.86

0.009

7.17

8.70

0.411
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(a) ER Random Network

(b) BA Scale-Free
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(c) WS Small World
Figure 4.4 Dynamic Cascade Failure size |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 |as a function of time 𝑡𝑡 on different networks
(with 0.95 confidence interval)
4.2.2 Varying Disruption Responder Team Size
Based on the results of the previous experiment, we will only be testing the CBA and DBA
policy from herein. Only two conceptual networks will be used in this experiment, BA and
WS, and with varying disruption responder team size |𝐴𝐴|. The responder collaboration

capability (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 (𝐴𝐴)) is fixed at 4 because it has been verified in the previous research

works (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) that changes in 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 (𝐴𝐴) will have positive
correlation on performance of resource allocation policy. The simulation parameter for

this experiment is summarized in Table 4.6. A critical range of |𝐴𝐴| in BA and WS have also
been observed in previous research works (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016). Beyond this

critical range, the responder team size is either too scarce or too abundant, such that
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different allocation policies have minor influence to the performance metrics. The critical
range for BA and WS are 30 ≤ |𝐴𝐴| ≤ 42 and 56 ≤ |𝐴𝐴| ≤ 61, respectively.

Table 4.6 Parameters for TIE-DLOC Simulation on Varying Number of
|𝐴𝐴|

Parameter

Description

|𝐴𝐴|

Number of disruption responder agents:

Value

- BA scale-free

30 ≤ |𝐴𝐴| ≤ 42

- WS small world

56 ≤ |𝐴𝐴| ≤ 61

Degree for each agent

4

Agent’s traveling speed

1 edge/hour

Number of nodes in Client Network

500

Average degree of Client Network

4

Disruption repair timespan

1 hour

Cascade threshold

0.25

𝑢𝑢

Spread speed of propagating failures

1 edge/hour

Number of initial failures

5

𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅

Number of replication for simulation 100

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑣𝑣

|𝑁𝑁|

�������
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺

𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜑𝜑

|𝐹𝐹0 |

𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

scenario
Simulation length for each scenario

40 hours
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Table 4.7 and 4.8 summarizes the average performance metric increment percentage on
BA and WS, respectively. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 shows the value of each performance metrics
as function of |𝐴𝐴| on BA and WS, respectively, to illustrate the variation of performance
increment.

As it can be seen, the performance metric increments on both networks are constant
around the mean with low standard deviation. This result further adds to the conclusion
from the previous section: For a fixed network size |𝑁𝑁| and initiator failure size (|𝐹𝐹0 |), the
DBA outperforms CBA with a constant performance increment around the mean with

varying disruption responder team size. This result is also shown to be more statistically
significant on WS network where null hypothesis is rejected at significance level 0.1,
compared to BA network at significance level 0.2.
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Table 4.7 Mean Performance Increment on BA with Varying |𝐴𝐴|
Metric

Mean increment

Standard deviation of

p-value of one-

from CBA to DBA

increment

sample t-test**

(%)*
Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

-3.75%

0.035

0.028

Total distance

-3.46%

0.029

0.006

Total latency (𝑧𝑧)

-6.30%

0.051

0.207

Preventability

0.26%

0.006

0.175

traveled by agents
(∆)

(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 )

*Calculated by subtracting CBA result from DBA and divided by CB
**Null hypothesis of no increment
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Table 4.8 Mean Performance Increment on WS with Varying |𝐴𝐴|
Metric

Mean increment

Standard deviation of

p-value of one-

from CBA to DBA

increment

sample t-test**

(%)*
Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

-14.97%

0.040

0.000

Total distance

-9.56%

0.034

0.09

-19.63%

0.050

0.000

0.12%

0.007

0.05

traveled by agents
(∆)
Total latency (𝑧𝑧)
Preventability
(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 )

*Calculated by subtracting CBA result from DBA and divided by CB
**Null hypothesis of no increment
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Figure 4.5 Experiment Results on BA with Varying |𝐴𝐴|
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4.2.3 Varying Initiator Failure Size
The two previous experiments have validated the performance of the DBA policy relative
to CBA on the tested conceptual networks from the perspective of the server network (i.e.
responder team size). For this set of experiment, the performance difference between
DBA and CBA is further investigated by varying the size of initial failure |𝐹𝐹0 | . The

simulation parameters for this experiment are listed in Table 4.9. The conceptual
�������
networks tested (BA and WS) will have fixed |𝑁𝑁|, |𝐴𝐴|, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝐺𝐺 , & 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 (𝐴𝐴) at 1000, 50, 4 and
4, respectively. Five variation of initial failure size |𝐹𝐹0 | will be tested: 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, and
50, which corresponds to 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04 and 0.0.05 fraction of the total
nodes |𝑁𝑁|, respectively.

73
Table 4.9 Parameters for TIE-DLOC Simulation on Varying Number of
|𝐹𝐹0 |

Parameter

Description

Value

Number of disruption responder agents

50

Degree for each agent

4

Agent’s traveling speed

1 edge/hour

Number of nodes in Client Network

1000

Average degree of Client Network

4

Disruption repair timespan

1 hour

Cascade threshold

0.25

𝑢𝑢

Spread speed of propagating failures

1 edge/hour

Number of initial failures

5; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50

𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅

Number of replication for simulation 100

|𝐴𝐴|

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑣𝑣

|𝑁𝑁|

�������
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺

𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜑𝜑

|𝐹𝐹0 |

𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

scenario
Simulation length for each scenario

40 hours

Figure 4.7 and 4.8 shows the experiment results for total failure (|𝐹𝐹|) and total latency (𝑧𝑧)
metrics increment (%) on WS and BA, respectively. The experiment result reveals that
within a fixed client and responder network size, the performance of both network policy,
relative to each other, varies greatly with varying size of initial failures. The DBA performs
better within intermediate range of |𝐹𝐹0 |, while the CBA triumphs in the low range (|𝐹𝐹0 | <

25) and high range (|𝐹𝐹0 | > 40) of |𝐹𝐹0 | in WS small world network. Both metrics, |𝐹𝐹| and
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𝑧𝑧, observes a similar pattern. On other hand, the DBA constantly outperforms CBA within

the tested interval in BA scale-free network, albeit with a declining trend. This would

imply that DBA performs better relative to DBA in low range of initial failure size within a
fixed network size.
Based on this experiment, it can be concluded that the performance of CBA and DBA
varies between different network structure and initial failure size. Among different
network structure and within a fix range of failure size and number nodes |𝑁𝑁|, the

allocation policy behaves differently, e.g. in BA the DBA is constantly better than CBA
while it is not true in WS (Figure 4.7 and 4.8). On the other hand, within the same network
and fixed responder team size, the relation between CBA and DBA, in terms of
performance, is not strict; one can outperform the other depending on the initial failure
size. This is further supported by the statistical properties gathered from the TIE-DLOC
simulator presented in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11. On average, the DBA policy shows
improvements on all performance metrics compared to CBA on both networks. However,
these results are not statistically significant as indicated by the p-values of one-sample ttest on null hypothesis of zero increment. The BA network had a maximum p-value of
0.382, while the WS network had 0.865.
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Table 4.10 Mean Performance Increment on BA with Varying |𝐹𝐹0 |*
Mean increment

Standard deviation of

p-value of one-

from CBA to DBA

increment

sample t-test

Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

-13.06

14.937

0.382

Total distance

-0.01

4.377

0.998

-364.44

332.778

0.274

0.001

0.007

0.874

Metric

traveled by agents
(∆)
Total latency (𝑧𝑧)
Preventability
(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 )

* Result on |𝐹𝐹0 | = 40 omitted for consistency

**Null hypothesis of no increment
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Table 4.11 Mean Performance Increment on WS with Varying |𝐹𝐹0 |
Mean increment

Standard deviation of

p-value of one-

from CBA to DBA

increment

sample t-test*

Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

-10.81

63.962

0.865

Total distance

-9.56%

0.034

0.09

-274.45

1393.282

0.844

0.000

0.000

0.096

Metric

traveled by agents
(∆)
Total latency (𝑧𝑧)
Preventability
(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 )

**Null hypothesis of no increment

Figure 4.7 Experiment Results on WS with Varying |𝐹𝐹0 |
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Figure 4.8 Experiment Results on BA with Varying |𝐹𝐹0 |
4.3

DLOC Model Simulation: USA Western Power Grid

In this section, a real-world power grid system (PG) and its DLOC-CDR operation will be
simulated in TIE-DLOC. The objective of this final experiment is to test the validity of the
insights and conclusions gained from previous experiments on conceptual networks to
real-world networks. The client network will simulate a network based on the USA
Western Power Grid. The nodes of the client represent generators, transformers, and
substations and the edges represent transmission line (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). There are
4941 nodes in this network connected by 6594 edges. The average degree of this network
is 2.67.
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Past research works have analyzed the structural properties of the PG network (Watts &
Strogatz, 1998). PG has an average path length almost similar to that of ER with the same
size: 18.7 ~ 12.4 (PG and ER, respectively), but significantly higher clustering coefficient:
0.080 ~ 0.005 (PG and ER, respectively). The fact that the PG network maintains low
average path and high clustering coefficient entitles it to having the “small-world network
behavior”; most of the nodes can by another with small number of steps. Past research
results in DLOC model using the CBA allocation policy concluded that this property makes
the disruption responder less effective in recovering the client network as measured by
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016. The experiment in section 4.2.1 used the same
datasets and setup as (Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016) and has shown that improvement
in all of the performance metrics can be made by using the DBA allocation policy in CPI
with small-world networks (WS). Nevertheless, the PG does not perfectly imitate all the
properties that WS have; WS has a clustering coefficient of ~0.18 and a shorter right tail
distribution (see Figure 4.9). Given the difference in clustering coefficient and degree
distribution, it seems unreasonable to conclude the results of DLOC from WS model can
fully predict the PG network.

79

Figure 4.9 Degree Distribution of PG and WS
The simulation parameter for this experiment is shown in Table 4.12. In this experiment,
the disruption responder team has 500 agents and each of them are able to collaborate
with 300 others. The cascade threshold is fixed at 0.25 and failures propagates at 1
edge/hour. All four performance metrics used in section 4.2 will also be measured in this
experiment. Based on the insights of the varying initial failure size experiment (section
4.2.3), we will use two initial failure size |𝐹𝐹0 |, 5 and 49, to analyze the validity of CBA-DBA
performance change. Each simulation scenario will run for 40 hours with 100 replications.
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Table 4.12 Parameters for TIE-DLOC Simulation on USA Western Power Grid (PG)
Parameter

Description

Value

Number of disruption responder agents

500

Degree for each agent

300

Agent’s traveling speed

1 edge/hour

Number of nodes in Client Network

4943

Average degree of Client Network

2.67

Disruption repair timespan

1 hour

Cascade threshold

0.25

𝑢𝑢

Spread speed of propagating failures

1 edge/hour

Number of initial failures

5; 49

𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅

Number of replication for simulation 100

|𝐴𝐴|

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑣𝑣

|𝑁𝑁|

�������
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺

𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜑𝜑

|𝐹𝐹0 |

𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

scenario
Simulation length for each scenario

40 hours

Table 4.13 summarizes the performance metrics increment result from this experiment,
while Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 shows the statistical significance of the increments for
|𝐹𝐹0 | = 5 and |𝐹𝐹0 | = 49, respectively. Figure 4.10 shows the process of cascading failures

with disruption response control after initial failures on PG.
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The performance metrics increments show that the CBA policy performs better than DBA
in the PG network (for the current simulation setting). For |𝐹𝐹0 | = 5, the CBA has
significantly lower total latency 𝑧𝑧 at 2170.24 as opposed DBA at 2595.39, which
represents 19.59% increment reduction. CBA also performs better relative to DBA on the
other metrics with ≈ 10% increment. The disruption response over time (Figure 4.10.a)

shows that the DBA actually performs better (in terms of |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 |) than CBA during the initial
hours of the cascading failures (𝑡𝑡 < 9), though it was later outperformed by CBA. This
pattern can be explained by the following argument. By the vulnerability analysis on PG

(not shown), the Degree centrality is in fact more effective in identifying vulnerable
elements resulting in higher cascading failure size, 𝑆𝑆. This is supported by the degree
distribution of PG which shows the top 5 highest degree node can reach 2% of the nodes

in PG network, compared to WS 0.5% given the same size, which means these nodes are
more significant in terms of vulnerability – albeit not as significant as in the BA with the
same size reaching 8% of the nodes. However, this still doesn’t lead to foretell that the
DBA should perform better, as it has already been disapproved by the experiment result.
Another driving factor is the small-world property that the PG maintains due to its low
average path and high clustering coefficient. It has been studied that the small-world
property enables diseases to spread much more easily and faster due (Watts & Strogatz,
1998). This insight is in the same analogy of the Watts threshold model used in DLOC and
enables failures to propagate faster throughout the network, relative to the responder
recovery speed. Finally, these pieces of facts together construct the argument that the
DBA performs better during the initial hour because depots are better positioned to
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recover the vulnerable nodes if they are selected as initial failure throughout the
simulation replication. The significance of DBA during this initial hour is also supported
the PG’s degree distribution as aforementioned before. During the latter hours, the smallworld property enables the initial failures to propagate faster throughout the PG network,
which are widely spread within 4941 nodes. In this case, the CBA policy has better
positioning to reach to distant nodes since the responders are located between
intersection of shortest paths. This explains the turn-around point observe at 𝑡𝑡 = 9
(Figure 4.10.a) for CBA, while the DBA needs more time to reach the failing elements –

WS-like networks have low correlation between degree and betweenness centrality
(Holme et al., 2002). The validity of these argument also hinges upon the assumption of
propagation type we are modelling; in this case it is simple propagation as noted by the
low cascade threshold 𝜑𝜑.

Increasing the initial failure size |𝐹𝐹0 | further reduces the performance gap between CBA

and DBA. As it can be seen, all performance metrics have increments <10%. This pattern
confirms the study that was conducted in section 4.2.3 where the number of initial
failures affects the performance of both policies relative to each other. The DBA also had
much longer range in which before it was outperformed by CBA at 𝑡𝑡 = 11 (Figure 4.10.b).

Nevertheless, it can also be seen in Figure 4.10.b that both policies have marginal effect
towards disruption response operation because the inadequate number of responder
resource (|𝐴𝐴|) as signified by the increasing trend of |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 | towards the end of the initial 40
hours.
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In conclusion, TIE-DLOC simulation of USA Western Power Grid Network (PG) for
disruption response operation has helped validate the conclusion gained from
experiments in previous sections and bridge the gap between studies on conceptual
networks and real-world CPI networks. Conceptual networks (ER, BA, and WS) models
distinct properties of networks that are commonly found collectively in real-world
networks. In this case, the PG has small-world property which is modeled by the WS
network, but a degree distribution akin to the BA, though not purely power law
distribution. As result, the response behavior mimics an intermediary between the two
models. The DBA performs better initially due to power law-like degree, but later
outperformed by CBA due to the fast propagation in small-world and less correlation
between degree and betweenness centrality. By comparing the network properties of CPI
networks with conceptual networks model, decision maker and designer can better
predict the disruption response operation of the CPI network under different resource
policies and failures. It was also shown that in real-world CPI network, the CBA and DBA
can be used interchangeably depending on the network structure – each policies do not
constantly outperform the other.
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Table 4.13 Performance Increment of CBA-DBA on PG with varying |𝐹𝐹0 |
Metric
Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

Performance increment

Performance increment (%)*

(%)* for |𝐹𝐹0 | = 5
9.62%

for |𝐹𝐹0 | = 49

9.55%

5.02%

19.59%

5.29%

Total distance traveled

0.65%

by agents (∆)
Total latency (𝑧𝑧)

*Calculated by subtracting CBA result from DBA and divided by CBA

Table 4.14 Statistical Significance of Performance Metric Increment on one-sample t-test
for |𝐹𝐹0 | = 5
Mean increment

Standard deviation of

p-value of one-

from CBA to DBA

increment

sample t-test*

Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

28.28

33.442

0.399

Total distance

90.74

105.231

0.391

425.15

327.720

0.197

Metric

traveled by agents
(∆)
Total latency (𝑧𝑧)

*Null hypothesis of no increment
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Table 4.15 Statistical Significance of Performance Metric Increment on one-sample t-test
for |𝐹𝐹0 | = 49
Mean increment

Standard deviation of

p-value of one-

from CBA to DBA

increment

sample t-test*

Total failure (|𝐹𝐹|)

29.62

98.413

0.764

Total distance

485.77

119.759

0.000

2540.08

1366.21

0.065

Metric

traveled by agents
(∆)
Total latency (𝑧𝑧)

*Null hypothesis of no increment

(a) |𝐹𝐹0 |=5
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(b) |𝐹𝐹0 |=49

Figure 4.10 Dynamic Cascade Failure size |𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 |as a function of time 𝑡𝑡 on PG (with 0.95
confidence interval)
4.4

Summary

Incorporating vulnerability consideration to the of DLOC-CDR has yielded many useful
insights for future work in designing resource allocation policy for disruption responder
teams in CPI networks. From a network vulnerability point of view, the degree centrality
appears to be most effective heuristic to point out vulnerable elements of a network
under cascading failure. We initially conject that the results of vulnerability analysis to be
a good indicator of the performance of the respective CBA and DBA policy (Conjecture
4.1). However, Conjecture 4.1 is rejected based on the experiments results of 4.2.3. Thus,
network designer should not solely use network vulnerability indicator to select which
resource allocation policy to use.
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Two new heuristic resource allocation policy heuristics were implemented in this research,
namely the Degree-based Allocation (DBA) and Bridge-based Allocation (BBA) based on
degree centrality and bridge centrality, respectively. It was initially hypothesized that the
BBA would perform better than CBA because of its ability to detect and protect bridging
node which can increase the number of connected components in networks. However,
the simulation conducted proved otherwise. This is because the TIE-DLOC simulator does
not measures the connectivity state of the client CPI network. In reality, some CPI
network weights connectivity to be more important as opposed to number of failure itself,
e.g. water distribution network. This can be a future direction for the development of the
TIE-DLOC simulator to also measure network connectivity state.
Finally, it is found that two competing resource allocation policy heuristics, DBA and CBA
can be used interchangeably depending on the network properties a CPI network has.
From our experiment on conceptual networks (ER, BA and WS), we made a conjecture
(Conjecture 4.2) that by comparing the similarity of the network graph structural features
(average geodesic length, degree distribution, clustering coefficient) to that of the
corresponding conceptual network, we can make an inference on how well the CBA-DBA
policy will perform with respect to each other – given the same network size. Albeit a
general guideline is left for future work, some constant patterns have been found:
1. Varying disruption responder team size, while fixing agent’s degree, will yield an
expected increment value which approaches a mean with marginal STD. Varying
fixed degree will improve performance by increasing collaboration capability
(Zhong & Nof, 2015; Zhong, 2016).
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2. The performance increment from CBA to DBA, within a given network size, is
sensitive to the size of initial failure |𝐹𝐹0 |. Thus, network design must assess what

is the expected number failures that may appear simultaneously to trigger a
cascading failure.

3. The DBA policy constantly performs better compared to CBA on networks with
power-law degree distribution or similar to BA Scale-free. This assertion is
supported by experiments from section 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 and theoretically due to
the fact the DBA and CBA have high correlation in terms of their centrality (Holmes,
2002).
4. In networks with small world property, the performance increment from CBA to
DBA has a decreasing trend with increasing network size. For large network size,
the CBA will outperform DBA. This assertion is supported by the experiment
results in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 where in the latter the WS client network has
more nodes, |𝑁𝑁|, compared to the former and the DBA policy performs worse

than CBA. The same behavior is also prevalent in the PG network. Theoretically,
this can also be explained by the fact that: (1) the degree centrality and
betweenness centrality have lower correlation in networks with increasing

clustering coefficient (Holmes, 2002) and (2) Small-world properties allows
failures to propagates faster throughout the network. Due to fact (1), responder
agents under CBA policy are better positioned to travel quickly throughout the
network to recover propagating failures.
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CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The findings on this research can be concluded according to the RQ as following
1. RQ1: Graph Theoretical Analysis of DLOC
The DLOC models measures resiliency of networks under cascading disruption by
the Recoverability metric 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 which denotes the probability of a network to

fully recover from a cascading disruption. The behavior of cascade failure in DLOC
is driven by the underlying model of Watts Threshold Cascade. Using percolation

theory in graphs, past research works have been able to create an analytical model
to predict average cascade size in different networks (Watts, 2002). Motivated by
this, we hypothesize there exist a regime where 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1 for all different
networks and is driven by its degree distribution and threshold cascade 𝜑𝜑. We

found that this is true. More specifically, we found that if the fraction of vulnerable
nodes of the network, 𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 , is below 0.7, 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1. This hypothesis

was tested on three different conceptual networks with varying size to represent
the changes in topology and one real-world CPI network, the USA Western Power
Grid (PG). All experiment complies with the aforementioned hypothesis.
Furthermore, the experiment result complements findings from past DLOC
research works in terms of the “small-world” effect of on disruption response.
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Finally, this result can also be used a quick guideline for designers of e-Work
systems on evaluating the reliability of their disruption responder teams. Similar
analysis can also be conducted with different responder team size to produce a
more robust guideline.
2. RQ2: Protection of Vulnerable Parts of the Network.
Based on vulnerability analysis, two new heuristic resource allocation policy
heuristics were implemented in this research, namely the Degree-based
Allocation (DBA) and Bridge-based Allocation (BBA) based on degree centrality
and bridge centrality, respectively. However, BBA was later proven to be inferior
in performance compared to the two others.
The DBA and CBA can be used interchangeably depending on the network
properties that a CPI network have. From our experiment on conceptual networks
(ER, BA and WS), we made a conjecture (Conjecture 4.2) that by comparing the
similarity of the network graph structural features (average geodesic length,
degree distribution, clustering coefficient) to that of the corresponding conceptual
network, we can make an inference on how well the CBA-DBA policy will perform
with respect to each other – given the same network size. Albeit a general
guideline is left for future work, some constant patterns have been found:
a.

Varying disruption responder team size, while fixing agent’s degree, will yield
an expected increment value which approaches a mean with marginal STD.

b.

The performance increment of DBA and CBA, within a given network size,
sensitive to the size of initial failure |𝐹𝐹0 |. Thus, network design must assess
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what is the expected number failures that may appear simultaneously to
trigger a cascading failure.
c.

The DBA policy constantly performs better to CBA better on networks with
power-law degree distribution or similar to BA Scale-free.

d.

In networks with small world property, the performance increment from CBA
to DBA has a decreasing trend with increasing network size.

Based on the results of this research, we have identified selected topics that have big
potential for the development of DLOC model for future works:
1. Development analytical methods to approximate DLOC-CDR performance
The results and analysis from RQ1 implies that future works can be directed to
construct analytical methods in reviewing DLOC design, as opposed to the current
empirical methods. Analytical methods will further improve DLOC’s modelling
capability and versatility in aiding network designers by providing quick guidelines
and accurate approximation. Some references worthwhile reviewing is regarding
percolation theory and universal behavior of cascade and contagion behavior.
2. Measure Connectivity State of Client Network
Connectivity state is an important issue in complex infrastructure systems, such
as transportation network, water distribution network, etc. While the DLOC has
rigorously modeled failure states of network elements, it is still lacking the ability
to measure connectivity state. The inclusion of connectivity state may alter the
design guidelines produce by the current DLOC, as a new objective may be added
to minimize disconnection in network. This argument can be implied by the
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effectiveness of the BBA in the current DLOC (Chapter 4), which is inferior to CBA
and DBA despite the advantage of detecting bridges in network. Bridges are
important element networks where the severing of these bridges can increase the
number of connected components and disconnect a network (Bondy & Murty,
2008).
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